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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ENRICO J. CIARROCCHI, 







On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 08-01704) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 20, 2011 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 







 Enrico J. Ciarrocchi appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment to Unum Group (“Unum”) on his claim for rescission of a settlement 




 Ciarrocchi, a former accountant, has suffered from bipolar disorder with psychotic 
features since 1994.  In 1996, he submitted a claim under a disability policy he had with 
Unum, and Unum began paying monthly benefits under the policy.  In February 2003, 
Ciarrocchi and Unum entered into a settlement pursuant to which Unum paid Ciarrocchi 
a lump sum of $360,000 in exchange for his cancellation of the policy.
1
  Ciarrocchi 
attempted to start his own accounting business with the proceeds of the settlement, but 
his business ultimately failed. 
 In 2008, Ciarrocchi filed this lawsuit seeking to void the settlement agreement on 
the basis that he lacked the capacity to enter into it.  Unum removed the matter to federal 
court and ultimately moved for summary judgment.  The District Court granted that 
motion, concluding that Ciarrocchi failed to “create a genuine dispute of fact over 




                                              
1
 According to the release, the settlement equaled 72.5% of the present value of 
Ciarrocchi’s anticipated future benefits under the policy. 
2
 Ciarrocchi filed a timely motion for reconsideration that tolled the time period for filing 
an appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and filed his 
notice of appeal while that motion was pending.  His appeal became ripe for review once 
the District Court ruled on the outstanding motion.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).  As 
Ciarrocchi did not appeal the District Court’s order denying his motion for 
reconsideration, that order does not fall within the scope of our jurisdiction.  See Fed. R. 




 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 & 1441.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and may summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  Our review of an order granting summary judgment is 
plenary.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).     
 We agree with the District Court that there is insufficient record evidence from 
which a jury could infer that Ciarrocchi lacked the ability to understand the nature and 
effect of the 2003 settlement at the time he entered into it.  See Wolkoff v. Villane, 672 
A.2d 242, 245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“The test of capacity to make an 
agreement . . . is . . . that a man shall have the ability to understand the nature and effect 
of the act in which he is engaged . . . and the business he is transacting.”) (quotations 
omitted and alteration in original)
3
; see also Justofin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 
517, 521 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A] dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”) (quotations 
omitted).  The record reveals that, prior to settling with Ciarrocchi, representatives of 
                                              
3
 The settlement agreement does not contain a choice of law provision.  However, we 
agree with the District Court that New Jersey bears the “most significant relationship” to 
the transaction.  See Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885, 888 
(N.J. 1993) (listing considerations germane to conflict of law analysis).  
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Unum contacted his treating psychiatrist, Doctor Steinberg, for an opinion as to whether 
Ciarrocchi had sufficient capacity to execute a settlement.  The doctor, who had treated 
Ciarrocchi for nine years, reported that Ciarrocchi was capable of understanding the risks 
and benefits involved in the transaction and that, while he was “up and down” for the first 
three or four years after he was diagnosed, he had been stable for the subsequent four or 
five years.  Doctor Steinberg confirmed that opinion at his deposition, adding that he 
questioned Ciarrocchi with mathematical examples to ensure that he understood the 
nature of a lump sum payout.
4
  The record also reflects that Ciarrocchi negotiated with 
Unum to receive a greater settlement than Unum initially offered.  
 Ciarrocchi attempted to undermine Doctor Steinberg’s testimony by suggesting 
that he was biased because he knew that Ciarrocchi wanted to settle with Unum.  But that 
argument is not supported by the record.  Furthermore, it is apparent from Ciarrocchi’s 
own testimony that Doctor Steinberg was the person most familiar with his condition and 
most qualified to give an opinion on his capacity during the relevant time period.  And 
while the evidence upon which Ciarrocchi relies establishes that he initially struggled to 
get his disorder under control, that he continues to suffer from some symptoms, and that 
he still takes medication, it does not undermine the unrefuted evidence that he was 
                                              
4
 In a filing in support of his appeal, Ciarrocchi contends, for the first time, that he never 
received a copy of the doctor’s deposition.  Notably, he does not contend that he ever 
requested and/or paid for a copy, nor does he identify any prejudice he suffered as a 
result.  Furthermore, the record reflects that Unum served Ciarrocchi with the exhibits 
filed in support of its summary judgment motion, which included an essentially complete 
copy of the doctor’s deposition. 
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competent to enter into the 2003 settlement.  See Jennings v. Reed, 885 A.2d 482, 489 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (doctor’s opinion that plaintiff “suffered anxiety and 
emotional trauma due to a longstanding medical condition” did not establish that 
plaintiff, who negotiated modifications to an agreement, was “unable to comprehend the 
nature and extent of his acts”).  That the business Ciarrocchi started with the proceeds of 
the settlement did not succeed is unfortunate, but his determination, in hindsight, that 
monthly benefits would have been preferable to a lump sum payment is not an 
appropriate basis for voiding the settlement agreement. 
 As Ciarrocchi’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
